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COMMENTS
the judgment conclusive upon the merits? Apparently the federal
court would be duty bound to follow the decisions of the state
courts respecting the idea of reciprocity, and must of necessity
hold the judgment to be conclusive upon the merits.
In a state where reciprocity has been received with favor,
the decision, of course, would be exactly opposite. Here the fed-
eral court, for the very same reasons, would be duty bound to
apply the doctrine of reciprocity.
Some difficulty arises where a judgment obtained in France
is sought to be enforced in a federal court in a state wherein the
reciprocity idea has never been considered. For instance, in Lou-
isiana it is the law that in the absence of the well-settled excep-
tions, that is, fraud or lack of jurisdiction, a judgment obtained in
a foreign country is conclusive upon the merits. Since this is the
law of Louisiana, under the Erie Railroad Company doctrine it
must be applied as such. In the absence of circumstances showing
a probable reception of reciprocity, what reason would a federal
court sitting in Louisiana have to interject the reciprocal comity
doctrine? That would not be the law of Louisiana, but clearly
federal general common law, and under the Erie Railroad Com-
pany case, "There is no federal general common law. Congress
has no power to declare substantive rules of common law appli-
cable in a State whether they be local in their nature or 'general,'
• . .And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a
power upon the federal courts."69 Hence, the federal court would




In the field of torts, as in any other field of law, it is necessary
in order for the injured party to bring a successful suit that he
be given by some law a cause of action. The question immedi-
ately arises as to which law the injured party will look in deter-
mining whether he has a cause of action against the defendant.
The courts have had little difficulty when all the events giving
rise to the action occur in one jurisdiction,1 whether the forum
69. 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 822, 82 L.Ed. 118, 119, 114 A.L.R. 1487,
1493 (1938). See Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 64 S.Ct. 7, 88 L.Ed.
9 (1943).
Graduate of February 1950; presently Member, Shreveport Bar.
1. See 15 C.J.S. 897, note 63, for collection of cases. See also Hunter v.




be within the jurisdiction where the action arose or in a foreign
state or country. In this simple factual situation the well-settled
rule in the United States is that the decision will be in accord
with the law of the place where the injury occurred. 2
A more complicated problem is presented, however, in the
case where there is conduct in one state causing harm in another,
or activity in several states causing harm in one, or action in one
state causing harm in several states. Because a tort usually con-
sists of two elements, conduct and harm, it is obvious that both
need not occur within one jurisdiction. In such cases the court
must become selective and determine in which state the wrong
shall be localized. The prevailing American view is that the law
of the place of the harm determines liability, rather than the law
of the place where the defendant acted.3 The primary proponent
of this theory was the late Professor Beale, who set out the stereo-
typed rule that "the place of wrong is the place where the person
or thing harmed is situated at the time of the wrong. ' '4 This rule
was adopted as Section 377 of the Restatement of the Conflict of
Laws. In support of this proposition, Professor Beale cited several
cases 5 which purport to represent the prevailing opinion of the
American courts. In a recent article,6 Professor Max Rheinstein
has shown that the cases cited do not conclusively support the
stated rule, where the acts and consequences occur in different
jurisdictions.
Professor Rabel, speaking of the basic concept of tort law,
suggests:
"'A primary purpose is to fix the standard of conduct of
a person so he can know what he may do and what he may
not do, and so that others can know what type of conduct to
expect from him.' " '7
In other words, the law should be such as to protect the actor's
2. Notes 133 A.L.R. 260, 15 C.J.S. 897; Stumberg, Conflict of Laws (1937)
163; Minor, Conflict of Laws (1901) 479; 2 Beale, The Conflict of Laws (1935)
1287-1288, § 377.2.
3. Ibid.
4. 2 Beale, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1287.
5. Id. at 1287, n. 4; Moore v. Pywell, 29 App. D. C. 312, 9 L.R.A. (N.S.)
1078 (1907); Keller v. Fred T. Ley and Co., 49 F.(2d) 872 (C.C.A. 1st, 1932),
(same case) 65 F.(2d) 499 (C.C.A. 1st, 1933); Cameron v. Vandergriff, 53 Ark.
381, 13 S.W. 1092 (1890); Otey v. Midland Valley R.R., 108 Kan. 755, 197 Pac.
203 (1921); Connecticut Valley Lumber Co. v. Maine Cent. R.R., 78 N.H. 553,
103 Atl. 263 (1918).
6. Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong: A Study in the Method of Case
Law (1944) 19 Tulane L. Rev. 4, 165.
7. 2 Rabel, The Conflict of Laws, A Comparative Study (1947) 309,
quoting Cheatham, Cases (1934) 416.
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"justified expectations," so that he will not be taken by surprise
if the consequences of his actions should cross into another juris-
diction. By following the strict letter of the rule set forth by
Professor Beale, a person would be susceptible to an action for
damages if he acted pursuant to law in one state and the injurious
consequences of his actions occurred in a second state which im-
posed liability for this type of conduct. Disturbed by the possi-
bility of such unjust results, the draftsmen of the Restatement of
Conflicts inserted an exception from liability under the law of the
place of impact, if the actor's conduct was "privileged" by the law
of the place where he acted.8 However, the scope of this exception
is as obscure as the reason why exemption from liability should
be granted to conduct generally prohibited, but "privileged" for
some special reasons, but not for conduct which is not prohibited
at all at the place of acting.
Both prior and subsequent to the Restatement, writers0 in
the field of conflict of laws, as well as the courts, have occasionally
expressed doubts as to the appropriateness of the place of harm
theory. One writer expresses his view that:
"Unfortunately for the proponents of the theory in question
[place of harm], when it is sought to apply it to more com-
plex situations, difficulties are encountered for which the
theory has not made adequate provision." 10
The courts have likewise shown a tendency to veer away from
the place of harm rule in cases where injustice would be done by
strict adherence to it. In Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corporation,"
the defendant, an automobile sales company maintaining a branch
business in Buffalo, New York, has authorized an employee of
that branch to use one of its automobiles. Subsequently, the em-
ployee, with plaintiff as his invited guest, drove the car to Wind-
sor, Ontario. An accident occurred in Ontario, and plaintiff was
injured. Under an Ontario statute, defendant would have been
liable even if the trip were not made for a business purpose.
Under the usual rule that the law of the place of impact governs,
the law of Ontario would have applied irrespective of whether or
not the employee had authority to operate the car in Canada.
8. Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) § 382.
9. 2 Callman, Unfair Competition (1945) 1589; Cook, The Logical and
Legal Basis of the Conflict of Laws (1942) 314; Hancock, Torts in the Conflict
of Laws (1942) 172; Rheinstein, supra note 6; Stumberg, The Conflict of
Laws (1937) 182.
10. Cook, loc. cit. supra note 9.
11. 68 F.(2d) 942 (C.C.A. 2d, 1934).
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The court, speaking through Judge Learned Hand, held, however,
that the defendant would be liable only if it could be shorn
that he had authorized the agent to take the car into Ontario.
This case definitely enunciates an exception to the place of
injury rule. Here the defendant's own activity was in New York
and the impact was in Ontario. In holding that the Ontario law
would not be applied unless the agent had been given authoriza-
tion to operate the car in Canada, the court implied that if no
authorization were given, the New York law would be applicable.
Obviously the court in this case realized the hardship that would
be visited upon the defendant if a strict application of the place
of impact rule had been adhered to.
In Siegman v. Meyer,12 defendant's wife had committed an
assault upon plaintiff while in Florida on vacation. Plaintiff
brought suit in the federal district court for New York, joining
both the defendant and his wife, alleging that since the harm had
occurred in Florida, the law of that state, which imposes liability
upon the husband for the torts of his wife, should apply. Under
the law of the forum the husband would not be liable for the torts
of his wife. The husband had not been in Florida at the time of
the assault. The court held that even though the tort had oc-
curred in Florida, it would not apply the common law rule of
that state and hold the defendant liable.
The place of harm rule has been disregarded even in cases
where its application would not have caused obvious injustice to
the actor and even though the effect is the imposing of liability
that would not have existed under the law of the place of harm.
In the Louisiana case of Caldwell v. Gore,'1 3 there was a shallow
drain traversing plaintiff's land in Arkansas and extending into
defendant's adjoining land in Louisiana. Defendant erected a
dam on his land across this drain, thereby impounding water on
plaintiff's land in Arkansas. Under Arkansas law a landowner
has the right to dam up the flow of water, while no such right
exists under Louisiana law. Action was brought in Louisiana to
have the dam removed. The court held that even though the
injury occurred in Arkansas, the plaintiff was entitled to drainage
rights over defendant's land in the same manner as if both pieces
of land were in Louisiana. The Louisiana Supreme Court plainly
considered the place of acting (building of the dam) as the place
12. 100 F.(2) 367 (C.C.A. 2d, 1938).
13. 175 La. 501, 143 So. 387 (1932), final disposition in 144 So. 151 (1932).
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of wrong, rather than the place of injury. In justifying the appli-
cation of its own law, the court said:
"Although the several states of the American union are dis-
tinct sovereignties, they are nevertheless members of the
same political family, which necessarily leads to a more inti-
mate relationship than is usual among independent foreign
nations. While foreign in some purposes, the states are united
in others.' 14
The decision in this case is directly contrary to the illustration
given under Section 37715 of the Restatement of Conflicts, which
designates the place of wrong as the place where the force takes
effect upon the land.
In Burkett v. Globe Indemnity Company16 plaintiff was
riding in a car with the owner in Alabama. The car, due to a de-
fect in the steering apparatus, ran into a ditch, injuring the plain-
tiff. It was discovered that a repairman had been negligent in ad-
justing the steering apparatus in New Orleans, Louisiana. Suit
was brought in a Mississippi court against the Louisiana repair-
man's insurer for damages caused by the accident. Without men-
tioning the Alabama law in the decision, the court decided the
case in accordance with the Louisiana law.
Here it will be noted that the court of a neutral state applied
the law of the state where the tortfeasor acted and not the law
of the place where the injury was sustained. The decision could
be explained upon the theory that Louisiana law governed the
contract for repairing and was therefore allowed to impose a
contractual liability upon the repairman in favor of third parties
suffering injury by reason of his negligence. Whatever may be
the theoretical explanation of the case, it is evident that the court
did not feel bound to apply the law of the place of injury. Instead,
the law of the place of acting prevailed.
Another pertinent example of the apparent tendency on the
part of the courts to depart from the usual rule is shown in the
case of Levy v. Daniels U-Drive It Auto Rental Company.17 The
14. 175 La. 501, 505, 143 So. 387, 388 (1932).
15. Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) § 377, Illustration 3. "When
harm is caused to land or chattels, the place of wrong is the place where the
force takes effect on the thing."
16. 182 Miss. 423, 181 So. 317 (1938).
17. 108 Conn. 333, 143 AtI. 163 (1928). In Chicago, R. I. and P. Ry. v.
McCrary, 179 Ark. 403, 16 S.W.(2d) 466 (1929), defendant negligently main-
tained a defective footrest on one of its coaches. Plaintiff boarded the train
in Arkansas and rode to Memphis, Tennessee, where he was injured when
he attempted to withdraw his feet from under the footrest. The Arkansas
1950]
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defendant owned an establishment in Connecticut, where he
rented a car to one Sack, who drove into Massachusetts, where
he negligently injured the plaintiff. Under the common law of
Massachusetts defendant would not be responsible. Hence, if the
rule that the law of the place of injury determines liability had
been applied, defendant could not have been held. However, Con-
necticut had a statute which imposed liability for the negligence
of a driver upon the person renting a car to such driver. Suit
was brought in a Connecticut court, and it gave judgment for the
plaintiff, although the injury occurred in Massachusetts. The
court reached the result upon the theory of a third-party bene-
ficiary contract. Apparently, the court employed this concept as
a device to rationalize its holding. It was motivated by the idea
that one of the policies underlying the Connecticut statute was to
provide incentive to the person who rents cars to rent them to
competent and careful drivers.
Similarly, in Lindstrom v. International Navigation Com-
pany,'8 the forum applied the law of the place of acting. The
deceased was riding on defendant's vessel on the high seas when
it shipped a large wave which swept him overboard. The jury
found that the accident was the result of defendant's negligence.
It was contended by the defendant that the part of the ocean
where the deceased drowned was the place of impact and that
therefore, since no law exists on the high seas giving an action
for wrongful death, the plaintiff should be denied recovery. The
court held that the defendant's activity on board the ship was the
proximate cause of death. The ship was held to be subject to New
York law and recovery was allowed.
From the Lindstrom case it is seen that peculiar difficulties
may arise in attempting to localize the impact in actions of wrong-
ful death. The interest protected by death statutes is not that of
the person killed in his continued life, but that of the survivors
in being deprived of their supporter and close relative. Strict
adherence to the rule of the Restatement 9 would require the
localization of this intangible interest, but, because of the obvious
difficulties of the task, even the Restatement approves the court's
inconsistency in localizing the tort at some other place, usually
court applied its own law without mentioning the conflict of laws problem
involved. Again in Johnson v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 167 Ark. 660, 269 S.W. 67
(1925), the Arkansas court applied the law of the place of acting (Arkansas)
when, as in the McCrary case, the negligence was In Arkansas and the injury
in Oklahoma.
18. 117 Fed. 170 (E.D. N.Y. 1902).
19. Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) § 392.
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the place where the impact upon the body of the deceased
occurred.
It is well to note several cases dealing with unfair competi-
tition, patent and copyright infringements, which are in keeping
with the trend of disregarding the place of impact rule.
In Addressograph-Multigraph Corporation v. American Bolt
and Manufacturing Company,20 suit was brought in a federal dis-
trict court in Illinois as a result of alleged unfair competition in
misappropriating plaintiff's system of marketing mechanical
addressing machines. For use in its machines, plaintiff manu-
factured special address plates from which it derived a large
measure of its profits. Defendant duplicated the plates manufac-
tured by plaintiff and by introducing them into the market
injured plaintiff's sales of its own address plates. Defendant main-
tained its principal place of business in Illinois, where it received
and filled orders for the plates. Although the defendant's acts
were not considered illegal under the law of Illinois, plaintiff
claimed that the effect of the defendant's competitive acts had
taken place in states other than Illinois, and that, therefore, the
law of these states should apply. The court, however, applied the
law of Illinois, rather than the law of each state where defend-
ant's activity had its injurious effect. Here again we see the
reluctance on the part of the court to follow the strict rule of
"place of injury." It is obvious from the outset that a great
burden would be imposed upon the tribunal of the forum if it
attempted to apply the law of each state where some impact had
been noted from the defendant's activity. By resorting to the
law of the place of defendant's activity, the task of the court was
greatly facilitated.
In Triangle Publications v. New England Newspaper Publish-
ing Company2' a multiple contact problem similar to the one
raised in the Addressograph case was presented to the federal
district court sitting in Massachusetts. Here the defendant, a
newspaper publisher, had appropriated certain horse racing in-
formation gathered by the plaintiff and had published it in its
newspaper without plaintiff's consent. Plaintiff sued to enjoin
this activity on the ground that its copyright was being infringed
by the defendant. The papers were published in Massachusetts
and probably circulated in several other states. When the ques-
tion arose as to the law applicable, the court held that the fact
20. 124 F. (2d) 706 (C.C.A. 7th, 1941).
21. 46 F. Supp. 198 (D.C. Mass. 1942).
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that publication occurred in Massachusetts alone would justify
application of Massachusetts law. Furthermore, the court stated:
"Even if some part of defendant's papers were sold in other
states (which is not clear from the evidence), the Massachu-
setts court in determining issues of damages would probably.
not apply to such sales the rules of unfair competition pre-
vailing in these states. And certainly the Massachusetts
courts, and fortiori this court, in considering whether to is-
sue an injunction would be guided solely by Massachusetts
rules of unfair competition, and would ignore the rules of
unfair competition prevailing elsewhere. '22
Thus, again, we see the court conveniently abandoning the place
of impact rule in rendering its final decision in the case.
In an older leading case 23 concerning unfair competition
alleged to have been committed by the use of a brand which was
protected as a trade mark in the United States, but not in Ger-
many, the American court took jurisdiction and applied American
law because the fraudulent conspiracy to affix the brand in
Germany on the barrels to be sent there was conceived in the
United States and the barrels were manufactured and filled here
and shipped from American ports. Though the effect of the
activity would be registered in Germany, the federal court applied
American law and enjoined the activity in this country.
From a survey of the cases involving multiple contact torts,
it may be seen that the courts frequently look to the law of the
place where the defendant acted. It is apparent that much incon-
venience would be experienced by the court if it attempted to
apply the law of each place where some amount of injury mani-
fested itself. In view of these administrative difficulties the courts
have shown a definite trend toward applying the place of acting
rule.
Similarly, the courts have encountered some difficulty with
regard to the place of impact rule when dealing with violations
of a person's right of privacy. In Banks v. King Features Syndi-
cate, Incorporated,24 X-rays were made of plaintiff's pelvic region
in order to discover the location of a hemostat left in her after
a previous operation. These X-rays were given by her physician
to a newspaper reporter, who transferred them to defendant, who
22. Id. at 203.
23. Vacuum Oil Co. v. Eagle Oil Co. of New York, 154 Fed. 867 (D.C.
N.J. 1907).
24. 30 F. Supp. 352 (S.D. N.Y. 1939).
[VOL. X
COMMENTS
subsequently published the pictures in its newspapers through-
out the United States. In considering the problem of choice of
law, the court quoted from the Restatement of Conflicts, Section
378, then stated:
"But if there is a series of acts, or a train of events, cutting
across state lines, the question as to which law should be
applied becomes a bit involved. In such case the law of the
'place of wrong' will control. Under Section 377, Restatement
of Conflicts, the place of wrong is the state where the last
event necessary to make the actor liable for the alleged tort
takes place. '2 5
This case clearly shows the court's intention to apply the
"place of impact" theory, but it is difficult to find where that
place is localized in the case of the invasion of an interest as
intangible as that of privacy. Apparently the court considered
the place of "first impact" as being most nearly connected with
the privacy which was here invaded.
Aside from the multiple contact cases, a very recent case 6
presented a situation readily susceptible to the application of the
place of injury rule. As in the case of invasion of privacy, the
court was called upon to determine where the impact occurred
when dealing with another intangible interest, that is, that of
a husband in the undisturbed affections of his wife. The plaintiff
and his wife were domiciled in Pennsylvania. While the husband
was in the armed service abroad, his wife went to Massachusetts,
where she met the defendant, a citizen of that state. An overly
friendly relationship developed between the plaintiff's wife and
the defendant, and as a result of this relationship plaintiff brought
suit in the Federal District Court for Massachusetts for alienation
of affections. This type action was abolished by statute in Penn-
sylvania, but not by the laws of Massachusetts. Defendant argued
that the asserted harm had been inflicted on the marital relation-
ship at the marital domicile in Pennsylvania and, that, conse-
quently, the action should be decided according to the laws of
that state. Under the impact theory, the Pennsylvania law should
apply because, although the activity was admittedly carried on in
Massachusetts, the relational interest alleged to have been vio-
lated thereby was located in Pennsylvania, the marital domicile.
Apparently the court experienced difficulty in attempting to find
at what place the defendant's action caused the injury to the
25. Id. at 354.
26. Gordon v. Parker, 83 F. Supp. 40 (D.C. Mass. 1949).
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plaintiff. In reaching his final conclusion, Judge Wyzanski
avoided the "place of wrong" inquiry, weighed the relative in-
terests of the two states and decided to apply Massachusetts law.
In this case the definition set forth in the Restatement as the place
of wrong would have left many questions unanswered. Where
did the "last event necessary to make the defendant liable" take
place? Was the loss sustained in India where the plaintiff was at
the time, or in Pennsylvania where the plaintiff ordinarily en-
joyed the rights and privileges of consortium, or was it in Massa-
chusetts, where the defendant acted? Manifestly the court was
motivated by something more far re'aching than the application
of the stereotyped rule of "place of injury." Here the defendant
acted in Massachusetts, where he was presumed to have known
that he would be liable for his conduct. According to the basic
theory of tort law, the standards governing his activity were set
forth in the laws of Massachusetts. The defendant violated the
accepted standard of conduct, and even though the repercussions
of his conduct may have occurred in other states, the court very
properly held that he would be liable under the law of the place
where he acted.
From a detailed examination of the cases involving elements
of a tort occurring in different jurisdictions, it thus appears that
two categories readily evolve. First, there are those cases where
action appears in one state causing harm in several states, such
as publishing a newspaper; 27 and those where the action in several
states causes harm in one, such as in the unfair competition,
patent and copyright infringement cases, 28 where the harm may
be said to occur at the defendant's principal place of business. In
both these situations the courts look to the place where the activ-
ity occurred, obviously because of the facility with which its law
may be applied.
The second category consists of those cases in which there
is action in one state resulting in an impact in only one other
jurisdiction. 29 In the past the courts have given these cases a
summary treatment by applying the "place of injury" rule3° and
27. Triangle Publications v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 46
F. Supp. 198 (D.C. Mass. 1942).
28. Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. American Bolt and Manufac-
turing Co., 124 F. (2d) 706 (C.C.A. 7th, 1941); Vacuum Oil Co. v. Eagle Co. of
New York, 154 Fed. 867 (D.C. N.J. 1907).
29. Caldwell v. Gore, 175 La. 501, 143 So. 387 (1932), final disposition in
144 So. 151 (1932); Lindstrom v. International Nay. Co., 117 Fed. 170 (E.D.
N.Y. 1902); Burkett v. Globe Indemnity Co., 182 Miss. 423, 181 So. 316 (1938);
Gordon v. Parker, 83 F. Supp. 40 (D.C. Mass. 1949).
30. Supra note 2.
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justifying it on the questionable theory of vested rights. As
stated by Professor Stumberg, "Its greatest virtue is its simplicity,
the facility of its application."'
It is eminently clear that the jealous adherence to this rule
will lead to hardship in many cases. As has been pointed out
above in the cases referred to, the courts have realized this fact
and, upon considerations of sound social policy and basic tort
theory, are leaning toward applying the law of the place where
the tortfeasor acted. It is submitted that this solution to the prob-
lem produces a more just result and better serves the social func-
tion of the law.
SIDNEY E. COOK*
CHOICE OF LAW IN MULTISTATE LIBEL SUITS
It is generally considered axiomatic that the creation and
extent of tort liability is governed by the law of the place of
wrong.' The place of wrong is defined as the place where the
impact occurs upon the interest alleged to have been violated.2
As the interest protected against defamation is that of a person's
interest in his unblemished reputation, 3 the place of impact is
said to be where the defamatory statement has been communi-
cated to third persons.4 Obviously, such a rule results in difficul-
ties where an allegedly defamatory statement has been published
in a newspaper or magazine which has been circulated through-
out the nation or even into foreign countries. With communica-
tion to third parties in every state and an impact resulting from
each communication,3 we are confronted with a dilemma as to
which law to apply. Furthermore, in mass publication of defama-
tory matter, we are faced with the closely related task of deter-
31. Stumberg, op. cit. supra note 2, at 182.
* Graduate of February 1950; presently Member, Shreveport Bar.
1. 62 C.J. 1109, § 27-28; 15 C.J.S. 896, § 12; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws
(3 ed. 1949) 260; Stumberg, Conflict of Laws (1937) 163.
2. Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) § 377; "The place of wrong Is
in the state where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for a
tort takes place." See, e.g., Alabama G.S.R. Co. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11
So. 803 (1892) (train negligently repaired in State X moves into State Y
where P is injured. Law of Y governs.); Le Forest v. Tolman, 117 Mass.
109 (1875) (Dog strayed from State X and bit P in State Y. Law of Y gov-
erns.).
3. Restatement, Torts (1938) § 559: "A communication is defamatory
if it tends to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estima-
tion of the community or to deter third persons from associating with him."4. Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) § 377, comment (a), note (3):
"Where harm is done to the reputation of a person, the place of wrong is
where the defamatory statement is communicated."
5. Ibid.
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